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Abstract 
Senior national security leaders face a diverse set of threats and greater uncertainty than in 
the past. They have called for adaptable or agile organizations and weapon systems to 
address this uncertainty. We focus on what this means for weapon system acquisition in 
terms of design, threats, and processes. Additionally, we show how metrics can be 
quantitatively used to help leadership understand the costs and benefits of adaptable and 
non-adaptable weapon systems. 
Introduction 
The United States is going to maintain our military superiority with armed 
forces that are agile, flexible, and ready for the full range of contingencies 
and threats.  
—President Obama, January 5, 2012 
Background 
The imperative for U.S. forces to be adaptive to changing circumstances is driven by 
uncertainty regarding potential threats and operational environments, coupled with likely 
reductions in force structure and modernization accounts.1 In many disciplines, time and 
time again, it has been demonstrated that expectations regarding the future are often 
wrong—sometimes very wrong, resulting in severe consequences. The Department of 
Defense (DoD) has not been immune from this tendency. The modesty these failures should 
engender is manifested in the importance accorded the idea of adaptability in recent pre-
eminent strategic guidance documents.2 Senior leaders are directing the DoD to prepare to 
be wrong. This perspective raises several questions: What is an appropriate conceptual 
definition of adaptability for the DoD? How does that definition apply to the different 
functions of the Department? And how could you operationalize and measure it in those 
functions? The first two questions have received some attention, the latter far less. 
Not surprisingly, the concept of adaptability has recently been scrutinized and 
considered within a DoD context. An enterprise-level definition used by the Defense Science 
Board (DSB; 2011) is “the ability and willingness to anticipate the need for change, to 
                                            
 
 
1 For example, now and in the future, there are no fewer than five interdependent domains for 
warfare: land, sea, air, space, and cyberspace. It has been rare in history for a new domain to be 
added to the short list of environments for warfare, and yet two such new domains, space and 
cyberspace, were added only recently (Gray, 2008–2009). 
2 See, for example, Office of the Secretary of Defense (2012) and Dempsey (2012). 
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prepare for that change, and to implement changes in a timely and effective manner in 
response to the surrounding environment” (p. viii). With this definition in hand, the DSB 
(2011, p. 30) reviewed the DoD enterprise and offered several recommendations, two of 
which motivated this paper: first, the call to align processes to the pace of today’s 
environment—more specifically, to employ dynamic trade space analysis; and second, to 
reduce uncertainty through better awareness. Regarding the second, however, the 
approach taken here assumes that the DoD will make little progress in this regard and, 
therefore, should place equal if not more emphasis on explicitly accounting for uncertainty in 
its capability development and acquisition processes.  
In Operation Iraqi Freedom and Operation Enduring Freedom, U.S. forces 
encountered an agile enemy adapting quickly in the tactical arena. In such operational 
environments, survival requires a local response. Success, however, depends on rapid 
response at all DoD enterprise levels (DSB, 2011, p. viii). In some instances, changes in the 
way our warfighters engage the adversary—modifying tactics, techniques, and procedures 
(TTPs) or concepts of operations (CONOPSs)—is the fastest, but not necessarily the most 
effective, response. In many cases, success depends on the introduction of new equipment, 
technology, or weapon systems.  
The objective of this paper is to support warfighters in the achievement of success 
on the battlefield by enabling the DoD to assess the adaptability of current, in-design, and 
in-development weapon systems; determine how modernization upgrades may enhance or 
degrade adaptability; and design future weapon systems to be adaptable. In so doing, it 
seeks to offer an answer to the question: How do you operationalize adaptability in the 
DoD’s technical capability base and its capabilities development process, and measure the 
degree to which the weapon systems resulting from those processes are adaptable (DSB, 
2011, p. 36)?3 
There are several incentives for focusing on weapon systems. Unlike other potential 
sources of adaptability (e.g., TTPs and CONOPSs), systems are long-gestation, long-lived 
assets whose design constraints prevail for decades. And these assets are costly—
Research, Development, Test, & Evaluation (RDT&E) and procurement accounts combined 
are approximately one-third of the DoD’s budget ($170 billion in 2013). Weapon systems are 
analytically tractable and amenable to rigorous examination and assessment, as they are 
subject to physical laws. Such analyses and assessments could serve as valuable inputs 
into strategies for developing adaptive TTPs, CONOPSs, skills, and organizations. For 
example, exposing operators to unutilized technical capabilities in current systems could 
encourage creative uses of the same.4 Additionally, an assessment of current and in-
                                            
 
 
3 The DSB recommended that development and acquisition planning include adaptability as a specific 
requirement metric. 
4 How many of us understand the technical capabilities of our smartphones? If more did, it is 
reasonable to expect that heretofore unknown novel uses would be identified. Consider the 
extraordinary number and types of apps that have been developed by the iPhone and Android user 
communities, for example. 
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development systems that finds a lack of adaptability might suggest that a cost-effective 
investment strategy for achieving adaptability now may lie in those other arenas.5 
This paper presents a set of concepts, working definitions, a framework, and a 
quantitative approach for evaluating adaptability in current, in-design, and in-development 
weapon systems and for supporting dynamic trade space analyses to enable the design of 
adaptive future systems.6 It proceeds with a discussion of three distinct but related concepts: 
responsiveness, flexibility, and adaptability.  
Concepts and Working Definitions 
These concepts are not new to the physical systems analytical community. Their 
discussion here, however, is novel in that the lens through which they are considered is that 
of the defense of the nation. The concepts of responsiveness, flexibility, and adaptability are 
taken from the dynamic system and control theory fields and modified for use by the DoD.  
 Adaptability is a measure of the change in the state variable of interest. 
 Flexibility is a measure of the effort required to transition from state x0 to x1.7 
It is inversely related (or negatively correlated) to the effort required to 
transition to a new state. A system that is flexible requires less effort to be 
reconfigured to reach state x1. 
 Responsiveness is a measure of the time required to transition from state x0 
to x1. Responsiveness is inversely related (or negatively correlated) to the 
time required. A system that is responsive requires less time to transition 
between states. 
Considering these concepts within the context of the paper’s objective, working 
definitions for assessing against and designing to adaptability are as follows: 
 Adaptability is a measure of the potential set of missions (or possible states 
within a mission space) that can be supported.8 
 Flexibility is an inverse measure of the costs of adapting (effort, capability 
tradeoffs, and dollar costs); the greater the costs to adapt, the less flexible 
the weapon system.  
 Responsiveness is an inverse measure of the time required to adapt (i.e., 
transition within a mission space or between missions). 
These definitions are distinct but related and apply equally well to weapon systems 
and their physical subsystems. The acquisition community will likely see a relationship 
                                            
 
 
5 For a study on skills development, see Burns and Freeman (2010). Alternative assessment 
approaches might be more appropriate for alternative acquisition strategies. Other strategies could be 
grounded in procuring larger quantities of single-purpose platforms or based on a systems-of-systems 
approach to capability development. 
6 The Joint Requirements Oversight Council (JROC) recently sent a memorandum to all DoD 
Components and Agencies to encourage requests for Key Performance Parameter (KPP) relief if 
KPPs appear out of line with cost-benefit analysis. A dynamic trade space analysis methodology 
would be a useful tool for informing such requests. See Joint Requirement Oversight Council (2013). 
7 For alternate definitions, see Ferguson, Siddiqi, Lewis, and de Weck, 2007. 
8 For a discussion of possible states within the same mission space, see Conley and Tillman, 2012. 
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between these terms and the traditional acquisition parlance of performance (potential), 
dollar cost, and schedule. 
Assessing and Designing for Adaptability 
Weapon systems and platforms typically remain in service for long periods, during 
which change often occurs—some of which is manageable and some not. Routinely 
dynamic international, operational, and fiscal environments should encourage the DoD to 
assess the adaptability of its current and planned weapon systems and ensure that future 
systems are designed to facilitate adaptation to changing circumstances. 
Assessing and designing for adaptability should not be confused with doing so for 
robustness.9 Even though each concept refers to the ability of a system to handle change, 
the nature of the change as well as the system’s reaction to it in each case is very different. 
Adaptability implies the ability of a design to satisfy changing requirements, whereas 
robustness involves satisfying a fixed set of requirements despite changes in the system’s 
operating environment (Saleh, Hastings, & Newman, 2003). An adaptable design is an 
active way to deal with future mission and/or operating environment uncertainty, as it 
includes core design resource margins assessed as most likely to be relevant across a wide 
range of potential futures. This approach is intended to minimize risks and maximize 
opportunities. Conversely, a robust design is passive, as it focuses on a system performing 
a fixed set of requirements satisfactorily regardless of the future environment (de Neufville & 
Scholtes, 2011, pp. 6, 39). 
Framework for Assessment and Design 
Designing for adaptability requires discussions—early in the capability development 
process—of mission requirements (i.e., capabilities), design resources, technical limitations, 
operational constraints, dollar costs, and their coupling to physical and engineering 
relationships. These factors comprise a high-order framework that can also be used for 
assessing the adaptability of current and in-development systems. Why these factors? 
System capabilities (e.g., range, speed, payload, force protection, probability of kill) depend 
on how design resources (e.g., internal volume, weight, power) are consumed and supplied 
by physical subsystems (e.g., engine, armor, fuel) and operational constraints (e.g., 
transportability weight limit, high hot limits) and are further bounded by fiscal constraints. 
These factors, while few in number, comprehensively describe a system from both a user 
and technical perspective. Their relationships are illustrated in Figure 1. 
                                            
 
 
9 Designing for adaptability should also not be confused with designing for an incremental acquisition 
approach to support an evolutionary acquisition (EA) strategy. In EA, a fixed requirement is met over 
time by developing several increments, each dependent on available mature technology. See 
Enclosure 2 of OUSD(AT&L), 2008. 
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 Relationships Comprising the Framework 
Capability envelopes and adaptability draw from the same reservoir, (i.e., design 
resources and operational constraints). Consider, as an example, the potential adaptability 
and flexibility of a nominal infantry fighting vehicle (IFV) initially developed to support a 
cross-country terrain mission. The measure of adaptability will be the number of potential 
missions the vehicle could support, with a specific focus on assessing adaptability for urban 
operations. The measure of flexibility will be the dollar costs and tolerability of capability 
trades required in order to adapt.  
Because this nominal vehicle was intended to traverse quickly across wide-open 
terrain, its original design sacrificed force protection for speed and range. Using the vehicle 
in urban operations would require significantly more force protection, thus requiring up-
armoring. It is assumed that there are numerous bolt-on armor kits available at reasonable 
dollar cost that would satisfy this need; however, utilizing such kits would, in turn, consume 
additional weight and power design resources. That consumption would then result in 
reduced vehicle speed and range (capability tradeoffs).  
The vehicle in this example could be assessed as adaptable, flexible, and responsive 
with regard to urban operations missions: 
 Adaptable: the vehicle had unutilized design resources (weight and power) 
that enabled up-armoring to provide additional force protection required for a 
new mission (urban operations). 
 Flexible: the dollar cost and capability tradeoff cost of adapting—force 
protection for speed and range—were reasonable and tolerable. 
 Responsive: applying bolt-on armor is not a time-intensive activity. 
The example highlights the fact that assessing adaptability is necessary, but not 
sufficient, for making decisions regarding potential system modifications/reconfigurations or 
initial designs. Flexibility and responsiveness should also be considered. Note that when 
adaptability requires capability tradeoffs, it should not necessarily be construed as negative, 
as the trades may be considered tolerable or even desirable. In the example, the loss of 
speed and range was deemed tolerable given the urban operating environment. 
Focus on Design Resources 
The framework suggests that design resource margins are the appropriate focus for 
both assessing and designing for adaptability. Why a margins-based approach when others 
have argued that modularity is the best route for “buying” adaptability? The focus on 
resource margins was not motivated by analytical or engineering preference; rather, it was 
driven by current defense strategic guidance and a review of the DoD’s recent capability 
development and acquisition history.  
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Current guidance calls for developing “cutting edge” technical capabilities. This is not 
new guidance, as DoD has historically developed systems with the objective of achieving 
superior technical performance. But its implications are significant from an engineering 
perspective. Superior technical performance comes from integral designs, not modular 
ones. There is wide agreement on this point across engineering communities. Modularity 
comes with technical performance costs; it tends to favor “business performance” over 
technical performance (Holtta-Otto & de Weck, 2007; Whitney, 2004). It is not surprising, 
then, that a review of recent MDAPs (including some in the design phase) showed an 
overwhelming majority of the programs were/are being designed as highly complex, highly 
capable, integrated-architecture systems—for example, the F-22, F-35, DDG-51 Flight III, 
and GCV.  
From an assessment perspective, then, the systems populating the assessment 
sample are almost entirely—if not entirely—integral rather than modular. From a design 
perspective, since it is assumed that the objective of retaining “cutting edge” capability will 
not be relaxed any time soon, integral designs will likely persist. Design resource margins 
are the most appropriate metric for measuring adaptability in integral systems and, 
therefore, are the focus of this approach. 
With all of that being said, systems can certainly be designed as integral-modular 
hybrids. Even in that type of design, however, a focus on design resource margins is most 
appropriate for assessing or embedding adaptability. It is instructive to consider recent 
comments on the subject by Chief of Naval Operations Admiral Greenert (2012). In 
promoting payload modularity, Greenert argued the design of future platforms “must take 
into account up front the volume, electrical power, cooling, speed, and survivability needed 
to effectively incorporate new payloads throughout their service lives” (p. 4). Stated 
differently, the platforms must be designed with margins sufficient to handle future payloads.  
The remainder of this paper applies the concepts, working definitions, and framework 
introduced above to the tasks of assessing the adaptability of current and planned weapon 
systems and supporting dynamic trade space analyses to enable the design of future 
adaptive systems. 
Enhancing or Degrading Adaptability 
As mentioned previously, capabilities and adaptability draw from the same reservoir 
of design resources, and those resources can either be consumed or supplied by physical 
subsystems. When assessing or designing for adaptability, uncertainty should be 
considered on the supply side (e.g., the state or trends of technology) as well as the 
demand side (e.g., the operating environment). On the supply side, it may be that future 
technological advancements in physical subsystems could supply future design resources to 
current platforms. For example, lighter armor could supply weight margin, and more efficient 
batteries could supply both weight and internal space margins. Considering the supply side 
enables assessments of the contributions that system upgrades would make to the 
adaptability of the system. Upgrades that consume design resources degrade future 
adaptability, while those that supply resources enhance it. 
Proofs of Concept 
Assessing the adaptability, flexibility, and responsiveness of current and in-
development systems requires an understanding of mission requirements, key design 
resources and their utilization, physical subsystems, operational constraints, costs, and their 
interactions and relationships. In this section, several proofs of concept are offered to 
illustrate the assessment and design methodologies. 
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Designing and Dynamic Trade Space Analysis: Proofs of Concept 
The approaches to designing for adaptability and supporting dynamic trade space 
analysis are nearly identical, absent the first item listed below: 
 Decide whether the system will be developed to be generally or specifically 
adaptable. This requires explicit recognition of the level of uncertainty 
associated with the missions and/or environments in which the system is 
intended to operate.  
 Identify the capabilities desired (and, more directly, the physical subsystems 
that will provide them) and the associated design resources that are either 
supplied or consumed by them.  
 Develop a physics-based understanding of the interaction between 
capabilities desired, physical subsystems, and design resources. 
 Identify operational constraints that limit performance. 
 Identify costs. 
In this section of the paper, a nominal IFV will be used to present two proofs-of-
concept. The first example will demonstrate how adaptability can be rigorously considered in 
the design of a system. It will also highlight an important issue not yet addressed in our 
design discussion—strategic value versus tactical cost. The second example will illustrate a 
more complex dynamic trade space analysis. These proofs-of-concept offer stark examples 
of how adaptability and capability draw from the same reservoir (i.e., design resources and 
operational constraints). Table 1 details basic performance and technical assumptions that 
will be used in both proofs. The cells labeled “Trade space” in the Capabilities (Desired) 
column will be the focus of the dynamic trade space analysis. 
 Nominal IFV Performance and Technical Assumptions 
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Designing for Specific Adaptability: Force Protection 
This proof explores potential vehicle designs that could enable future increases in 
ballistic force protection, thereby ensuring the IFV will remain operationally effective in 
increased-threat environments. It is assumed that a number of alternative futures have been 
assessed, resulting in a bounded range of potential force protection requirements—
STANAG Level 4 to STANAG Level 5.  
For any potential design considered in this proof, the performance objectives listed in 
Table 1 (e.g., mobility and reliability) must not be compromised if/when future upgrades to 
the vehicle occur. A design that supports adaptability to increase passive armor in the future 
must ensure now that the weight design resource is properly calibrated and supplied to 
enable this future addition. The primary physical subsystems that supply the weight 
resource are suspension and structure (see the Full Spectrum row in Table 1). Weight also 
interacts with the mobility requirement and drives the engine size. 
Referring back to the bulleted items that constitute the approach to designing for 
adaptability, the first three have been satisfied: specific adaptability was selected; desired 
capabilities and their associated physical subsystems and design resources were identified; 
and the interactions between them were understood. The remaining two items are 
addressed as follows: it is assumed that the C-17 will remain the heavy airlift vehicle for the 
foreseeable future; therefore, the transportability weight limit of the C-17 will be considered 
an operational (and, therefore, design) constraint. Regarding cost assumptions, see Patel 
and Fischerkeller (2013). 
Two vehicle designs were considered, to illustrate the relationships between their 
relative adaptability, flexibility, and responsiveness. One (“Optimized Vehicle”) represents a 
vehicle designed optimally to support the lower bound force protection requirement—
STANAG 4—with no margin incorporated for bolt-on armor upgrades to increase the force 
protection level. The other (“Adaptable Vehicle”) represents a vehicle designed (with regard 
to suspension and structure) to supply the maximum possible weight design margin to 
support the addition of future force protection capability; in effect, it was designed to support 
bolt-on steel armor upgrades to increase force protection to the upper bound force 
protection requirement—STANAG 5. Table 2 shows the comparisons. 
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 Performance and Relative 100th Unit Procurement Costs ($K of 
BY2012)—Optimized vs. Adaptable Designs 
 
The performance columns in Table 2 show that both vehicles perform equally well up 
through an operating environment requiring a force protection level of STANAG 4 + 60% 
STANAG 5. They do so, however, through very different means. While both vehicles carry 
steel armor at STANAG 4, the Optimized Vehicle’s force protection capability is increased by 
replacing steel with titanium armor. This must be a zero-sum weight exchange because the 
optimized vehicle was not designed to carry additional weight. Conversely, the Adaptable 
Vehicle was designed to carry additional weight and has its force protection capability 
increased through additional bolt-on steel armor. At STANAG 4 + 70% STANAG 5, the 
maximum weight the Optimized Vehicle can carry is exceeded, resulting in system failure. 
This is not the case for the Adaptable Vehicle. Not only can it still operate effectively in that 
environment, it can also accommodate additional bolt-on steel armor to operate effectively 
up to STANAG 5. 
Flexibility is captured in the chart via the relative (Δ) cost columns. At STANAG 4, the 
Optimized Vehicle has a lower relative unit procurement cost, however, as requirements 
increase, costs increase sharply relative to the Adaptable Vehicle because more expensive 
titanium armor is needed to maintain desired mobility and reliability. Embedding adaptability 
made for a more flexible vehicle, as its upgrade costs are less sensitive to changes in 
requirements. 
Finally, inferred but not captured directly in this chart is responsiveness. Steel armor 
must be stripped before titanium armor is applied to the Optimized Vehicle. This is far more 
time-intensive than bolting on steel to the Adaptable Vehicle. The Adaptable Vehicle, then, 
is more responsive. 
Designing for General Adaptability: Dynamic Trade Space Analysis 
This general adaptability proof illustrates a far-wider range of possible system 
adaptations and their dependencies. The technical and cost assumptions presented for the 
^Åèìáëáíáçå=oÉëÉ~êÅÜ=mêçÖê~ãW=
`êÉ~íáåÖ=póåÉêÖó=Ñçê=fåÑçêãÉÇ=`Ü~åÖÉ= - 156 - 
nominal IFV (Table 1) will again be used in this proof. This analysis will assume that an 
adaptable IFV is designed with a 20% weight margin, 100% electrical power margin, and a 
33% power margin relative to the optimized design, to support future unspecified capabilities 
for currently unknown missions and operating environments. Weight and power were 
selected because they dominate the design, as can be seen in their relevance to nearly 
every capability desired in Table 1. Power, in particular, was selected because experience 
tells that it can be traded in the future to support many different types of capabilities either 
directly or indirectly. As such, it is a core design resource that supports adaptability to many 
potential futures. As before, the performance objectives highlighted in Table 1 (e.g., mobility, 
reliability, and transportability) must not be compromised in any potential design. 
In order to illustrate one iteration of a dynamic trade space analysis, Figure 2 shows 
the cost, force protection, number of dismounts carried, and urban accessibility (percent of 
urban areas accessible) trade space for a vehicle designed with a 20% weight margin. This 
is a high-order analysis, a level at which adaptable design analyses should commence. The 
models behind this analysis are typically called screening models and represent simple, 
transparent, and readily understandable representations of the physical interactions of the 
physical subsystems.10 Screening models allow numerous iterations, to consider potential 
adaptable designs relatively quickly. They provide the ability to explore the art of the 
possible with minimal expense (time and dollars). The time for more complex, engineering 
point models is later in the design phase, not sooner (de Neufville & Scholtes, 2011).  
This dynamic trade space analysis illustrates a number of opportunities for 
consumption of that 20% weight margin in the future. For example, high urban accessibility 
would come at the cost of squad size and force protection. 
                                            
 
 
10 The Institute for Defense Analyses has created a suite of screening models for GCV analysis. They 
were the basis for analyses presented in Figure 1. 
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 Dynamic Trade Space Analysis Supported by General Adaptability 
Design 
Additional high-order analyses are also possible. Perhaps the 100% electrical power 
margin could be used for additional sensors and electronics. Would that affect internal 
volume available for dismounts? Would that additional weight consumption constrain future 
armor choices? Should mobility or transportability be traded? And so on. The multitude of 
questions one could ask is, again, a strong motivation for using these low-resolution 
analytical tools iteratively at the outset of the design process.  
Strategic Value Versus Tactical Cost 
The above analysis introduces an important aspect of designing for adaptability—
strategic value versus tactical cost (i.e., nominal program costs). Equating the two, 
especially when planning for an uncertain environment, is a mistake. While the relative costs 
of the Optimized Vehicle at STANAG 4 are less, should future emergent threats demand 
higher force protection, the costs of up-armoring (and concomitant capability tradeoffs) 
arguably decrease its strategic value compared to that of the Adaptable Vehicle.11 
As with insurance, the strategic value of a system should be assessed in terms of its 
contributions over all possible futures. Insurance and adaptability are justified by the value 
                                            
 
 
11 Our example assumed a smooth design and development process. Often, however, requirements 
are changed post-Milestone B, which leads to cost growth. This cost is not considered in the 
example. In reality, then, it may very well be that tactical costs for optimized and adaptable platforms 
are often comparable as changes in requirements could more easily be addressed by adaptable 
designs (see GAO, 2011, pp. 14–15; Bolten et al., 2008). 
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they bring when relevant events occur, not by their continual use (de Neufville & Scholtes, 
2011, p. 11). If we consider a “relevant event” as a future circumstance that requires the 
specification of new system requirements, several such events inevitably occur over the 
service lives of systems as new technologies or new threats emerge. At the right price, we 
willingly buy insurance as a hedge against uncertain future events. So, too should DoD as it 
faces an uncertain future. But how can decision-makers determine whether the price for 
adaptability is reasonable? Figure 3 illustrates a decision support chart that was constructed 
using the optimized and adaptable vehicle cost data presented in Table 2.  
Selecting either an adaptable or optimized system is a “bet” on future trends rather 
than any one specific outcome. For this example, selecting adaptability is a “bet” that future 
adversaries will employ capabilities that would require significantly more force protection 
than is required in current systems. Conversely, selecting an optimized design is a “bet” that 
future adversaries will not employ capabilities that would require significant changes to 
current force protection levels. 
 
 Capability Development and Acquisition Decision Support Chart 
The following examples, constructed from referencing Figure 3, illustrate how the 
chart can quantitatively inform capability development and acquisition decisions. 
Specifically, we can describe the “bet” that leadership is making in more quantitative and 
rigorous terms. 
An adaptable system provides the greatest strategic value if: 
 Leadership is confident there is at least a small chance that adversaries will 
employ capabilities that would require force protection levels above STANAG 
4.1, or 
 The weight margin can be utilized for other emergent requirements. 
An optimized system provides the greatest strategic value if: 
 Leadership is confident that there is a high chance that adversaries will not 
employ capabilities that would require force protection levels above STANAG 
4.1. 
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Costs from Table 2 are embedded in Figure 3 via a present value (PV) analysis of 
the optimized and adaptable systems. The Confidence Level contours (color code) 
represent the minimum annualized probability at which the adaptable system provides more 
value (e.g., lower PV). 
The approach taken to create Figure 3 can be replicated to create similar capability 
development and acquisition support tools for other systems. It enables decision-makers to 
explicitly account for uncertainty in their choices and review the consequences of that 
accounting. While preferably brought to bear sooner, such an approach would be very 
beneficial at the Analysis of Alternatives decision point. 
Which Resource Margins and How Much? 
Effective implementation of a margin-based approach to designing adaptability into 
weapon systems requires choosing which design resources should be allocated margin (or 
not) and calculating the size of that margin such that additional system value in future 
uncertain environments could be realized by consuming (or supplying) them in those 
environments.  
The designing-for-adaptability process presented previously informs resource margin 
decisions. In the proofs-of-concept, the capabilities were fixed values and the type and value 
of margin were known (the design resource of weight with the percentage of 20). In actual 
dynamic trade space analysis, all should be considered potential variables whose values 
(and also types, in the case of margins) would be determined for a final design through 
numerous exploratory analyses. Numerous iterations allow the analysts, operators, and 
other stakeholders opportunities to consider many different approaches to a design that 
satisfies known requirements and enables adaptability for unknown future requirements. 
The creative value of multiple iterations cannot be overstated and again, highlights the 
importance of using low-resolution screening models early in the design process.  
As trade space within and across capabilities and margins is being explored, Key 
Performance Parameters (KPPs) grounded in long-term forecasts in which confidence is 
moderate to low should be considered first for trade as the design team seeks to embed a 
margin for potential future requirements. One need only perform a cursory review of a 
handful of System Threat Assessment Reports (STARs) to see several examples of 
moderate and low confidences being cited. Returning to a point made earlier, routine 
failures to accurately forecast futures should engender modesty. That modesty can be 
operationalized as design margins to increase the potential strategic value of a platform. A 
similar perspective could be taken when reviewing KPP threshold (required) and objective 
(desired) values. To the degree the differences in those values are based on different levels 
of confidence in near- vs. long-term forecasts, that delta should be considered trade 
space—plan for the relative certainty, prepare for the uncertainty. 
This approach can and should, where appropriate, be complemented by experience. 
For example, the Navy incorporates power margins on ships as part of their service life 
allowances based largely on historical experience. Similarly, based on mission experience, 
the National Aeronautics and Space Administration (NASA) incorporates into all flight 
systems a 10% margin for power and 5° C thermal design margin to respond to post-launch 
uncertainties associated with the mission and environment, respectively (NASA, 2009, pp. 
13, 82). 
Conclusion 
Adaptability, flexibility, responsiveness—these terms need not be empty descriptors 
of the force desired by the White House and the DoD. They can be operationalized as 
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metrics against which the force can be assessed and towards which it can be designed. 
Current operational and fiscal realities call for an approach to enable those efforts. Absent 
one, the DoD risks stumbling forward into an uncertain strategic and operational future, 
possibly making significant force structure, modernization, and future weapon system design 
decisions that, at a minimum, do nothing to enhance the force’s adaptability and could, quite 
possibly, facilitate its degradation. 
A general utilization assessment of the current force’s major systems’ design 
margins would offer insights into the potential for adaptability to emergent circumstances in 
an uncertain future environment. A more focused look at those margins deemed most 
relevant to future missions and operating environments in which high confidence exists also 
would yield valuable and actionable insights. 
Designs for incremental modernization programs or entirely new weapon systems, 
which are expected to be in the field for decades, should explicitly incorporate adaptability. 
When considering upgrades or new designs, the perspective of strategic value vs. tactical 
cost should rule the day. It was noted previously that the DSB recommended an adaptability 
requirement for all future systems. The DoD enterprise is populated by systems engineers, 
operators, and other stakeholders who are both intelligent and fallible; consequently, 
unanticipated threats and opportunities often emerge late in the course of development 
(post-Milestone B) and long after initial fielding. But changes in requirements need not be as 
cost-imposing as they often are; adaptable designs could provide opportunities to apply 
those costs toward achieving greater strategic system value by enabling systems to be 
modified to execute currently unknown missions and operate in currently unknown 
environments. Where uncertainty is abundant, an adaptability requirement should be non-
negotiable—it must be a “need-to-have,” not a “nice-to-have.” 
Preparing for an uncertain future is not an insurmountable challenge for the DoD. 
Significant RDT&E and procurement decisions that take adaptability into account can be 
informed by rigorous analyses and assessments. We hope this paper has offered useful 
concepts, working definitions, and approaches to inform an intelligent path forward that 
enables the DoD to prepare to be wrong. 
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